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1 Introduction
Stochastic control models in economics aim at obtaining qualitative properties of value
functions and at deriving optimal control policies in order to analyse various economic
questions and to propose quite explicit recommendations. To meet this objective, economists
always follow a standard route which consists to build value functions in two steps:
i) derive the associated HJB equation whose solution gives a candidate value function,
and, as a by-product, a candidate optimal policy, if any,
ii) apply a verification theorem based on Itoˆ’s formula which asserts that a smooth solution
to the HJB equation coincides with the value function.
The key of this approach is to show that the HJB equation admits a solution that is regular
enough to apply the Itoˆ’s formula needed in the verification theorem. However, it is well-
known that the value function of a stochastic control problem is generally a solution to the
associated HJB equation in some weak sense such as in the viscosity sense. Yet, the concept
of viscosity solution does not give a clear set of conditions to derive regularity results for
multi-dimensional problems, even if it has proved to be very efficient to provide numerical
approximations of value functions, which forces to argue case by case.
A recent literature gives results to check at hand the regularity of value functions for one-
dimensional stochastic control problems: Strulovici and Szydlowski [23] avoid the concept
of viscosity solutions and use a shooting method to prove regularity results. Pham [17]
shows that the value functions of a class of optimal switching problems are differentiable
by means of viscosity solutions. Regarding multi-dimensional control problems, Soner and
Shreve [21], Hynd [12], [13] and Hynd and Mawi [14] prove regularity results for elliptic PDEs
arising from singular control problems. A common feature of these studies is the uniform
ellipticity assumption about the second order differential operator that defines the elliptic
PDE. Also in a multi-dimensional framework, Daskalopoulos and Feehan [6] and Lamberton
and Terenzi [15] obtain regularity results for the obstacle problem arising from the American
option pricing in the Heston model where the second order differential operator degenerates
only on the boundary of the domain.
Motivated by economic relevance, two-dimensional fully degenerate stochastic control
problems have emerged recently from dynamic contracting in corporate finance.1 In these
new models, existence of derivatives of value functions, regularity properties and existence
of optimal controls do not follow from the classical theory or from recent studies and can be
very challenging. We study in this paper such a model.
Specifically, we consider a dynamic contracting model in corporate finance in which the
firm’s profitability fluctuates across time and is impacted by unobservable managerial effort.
Thereby, we integrate in an agency framework with hidden action the issue of strategic
liquidation studied in the real option literature. We show that the principal’s problem
takes the form of a two-dimensional fully degenerate Markov control problem. We prove
regularity properties of the value function that are instrumental in the construction of the
optimal contract that implements full effort, which we derive explicitly. Our mathematical
1We review the literature below.
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results go beyond our model and complement the heuristic derivation of regularity results
made in recent economic studies on dynamic contracting in corporate finance.
Dynamic contracting models in corporate finance are based on the premise that two
factors drive the relationship between firm’s owners (principal) and firm’s managers (agent).
First, owners delegate tasks to managers. Second, incentives of managers and those of
owners are not fully aligned. The firm’s manager may take some actions providing him
private benefits and having a negative externality on the firm’s cash flows. This impacts
firm’s owner payoff. Those actions taken by the firm’s manager are typically unobservable.
Hence, the firm’s owner problem is to find the best contract that aligns the interest of the
firm’s manager with her own. Clearly, the mathematical formulation of the problem depends
on the modeling of the cash flows. A common assumption is to model cash flows generated
by the firm as the increment of an arithmetic Brownian motion
dYt = µ dt+ σ dZt, (1)
where (Zt) is a standard Brownian motion. The process (Yt) represents the cumulative cash
flows, its increment dYt the cash flows over a period [t, t + dt), and its drift, the cash flow
rate µ > 0, corresponds to the firm’s profitability.2 The attraction of modeling cumulative
cash flows as an arithmetic brownian motion comes from the simple form taken by incentive
compatibility conditions. The principal problem reduces then to a tractable one-dimensional
Markov control problem whose value function has well established regularity properties.3 In
this standard environment, shocks on cash flows are identically, independently distributed.
The firm’s profitability µ > 0 is constant across time and liquidation is always inefficient.
Notably, leaving aside agency issues, the value of the firm at any time t is
E
(∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)dYs
)
=
µ
r
,
which clearly shows that the classic dynamics (1) is not appropriate to study optimal exit
decision.
We consider the simplest modeling of the cash flows that allows to integrate a strate-
gic liquidation issue in an agency framework. In our model, the firm produces cash flow
Xt dt, where Xt evolves according to a Brownian motion with volatility σ. Specifically, the
cumulative cash flows process Y follows now the dynamics
dYt = Xt dt, (2)
where Xt = x + σZt. The cash flow rate Xt corresponds to the firm’s profitability which
fluctuates across time in sharp contrast with the environment defined by (1). Cash flows
are serially correlated over time and strategic liquidation is an issue. In particular, leaving
aside agency issues, the value of the firm at any time t is v0(Xt) where
v0(x) = sup
τ
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rsXxs ds
]
, (3)
2See the seminal paper of De Marzo and Sannikov [7] and Biais, Mariotti and Rochet [1] for a survey of
the literature.
3See e.g. Sannikov [20], De Marzo and Sannikov [7] and Strulovici and Szydlowski [23].
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which corresponds to a standard exit problem studied in Dixit and Pindyck [9]. We study
how moral hazard with unobservable managerial effort impacts this simple strategic liquida-
tion problem. The dynamics of equation (2) defines an environment in which the principal
is concerned with the random profitability of the firm (that may induce her to strategically
liquidate it) and by the agent’s actions on the profitability of the firm. The two concerns
are very much interconnected. We show that the principal’s problem takes the form of a
two-dimensional Markov control problem with state variables, the so-called continuation
value of the agent, and the level of the firm’s profitability. The associated HJB equation is
fully degenerate with discontinuous coefficients. Following the literature, we solve the firm’s
owner problem in the set of contracts that induce the manager to exert full effort all the
time. We establish all the required regularity properties of the associated value function.
We point out at each step of our analysis the novelty of our results and explain how they
complement recent studies.
Considering a setting in which cash flows are serially correlated across time is key for
our analysis. This relates our study to the literature on dynamic contracting with persistent
private information initiated by Zhang [26], Strulovici [22] and Williams [25]. In these
papers, the principal-agent problem is formulated as a cash diversion problem where principal
demands (thruth-telling) reports from the agent. Theses studies are not related to real
option theory and to the issue of strategic liquidation. Closer to our study are Faingold
and Vasama [10] and Vasama [24] who develop cash diversion models linked to real option
theory. Again, our model deals with unobservable managerial effort on firm’s profitability
and is therefore different. DeMarzo and Sannikov [8] study a dynamic contracting learning
model in which the firm’s profitability is constant but unknown by the principal and the
agent. Our results provide a mathematical ground to these studies that overlooked regularity
issues. A last related study is He [11] who proposes an agency model in which the agent
controls the size of the firm that follows a geometric brownian motion. Strategic liquidation
is not an issue and a scale invariance property allows to write the principal’s problem as
a one-dimensional control problem. Thus, mathematical issues are very different from our
paper. Still, in our model, as in He [11], the cash flow rate fluctuates and is impacted by
unobservable managerial effort. It follows that the implementation of the optimal contract
is very similar. Specifically, we find that a performance-based grant that involves a stock
and a bond implement the optimal contract. The difference with the He’s implementation
relies on the use of a bond which accounts for the strategic liquidation issue in our model.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the mathematical model
and writes the principal’s control problem. Section 3 derives the incentive compatibility
conditions and the Markovian representation of the principal’s problem. Section 4 contains
our main results. We derive regularity properties of the value function of the principal’s
problem, characterize the optimal contract in the class of contracts inducing effort at any
time, and discuss the implementability of the contract. Section 5 summarizes our findings
and presents open questions for future research.
2 The model
Principal and agent. We consider a firm that hires a manager to operate a project. The
firm’s owner, or the principal, has access to unlimited funds and the manager, or agent, is
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protected by limited liability. The agent and the principal both agree on the same discount
rate r. We assume that, at any time t, the project produces observable cash flows if and
only if the manager is in charge. In particular, the project is abandoned when the manager
is fired and we assume without loss of generality that its scrap value is zero. The cumulative
cash flows process (Yt) and the profitability process (Xt) evolve as
dYt = Xt dt and dXt = −δat dt+ σdZat , X0 = x (4)
where δ and σ are positive constants, (Zat ) is a Brownian motion, and at ∈ [0, 1] is the
agent’s unobservable action. The unobservable action at = 0 is called the effort action, the
unobservable action at > 0 is called the shirking action. Thus, shirking has a negative effect
−δat on profitability. Whenever the agent shirks, he receives a private benefit Bat dt where
B is a positive constant.
Probabilistic model. Formally, we consider the probability space Ω = C([0,∞),R), the set
of continuous real functions on [0,+∞) endowed with the Wiener measure denoted by P0.
Let (Zt) be a Brownian motion under P0. We denote (Ft) the natural filtration generated
by (Zt) completed by the P0 null sets. Under P0, we assume that the project’s profitability
evolves as
dXt = σdZt.
Thus, P0 corresponds to the probability distribution of the profitability when the agent
chooses at any time the effort action. For any action process a = (at) which is assumed to
be a Ft adapted process with values in [0, 1], we define
γat = exp
[∫ t
0
−
(
δas
σ
)
dZs − 1
2
∫ t
0
(
δas
σ
)2
ds
]
.
Because the action process (at) is bounded, the process (γ
a
t ) is an F - martingale. We then
define a probability Pa on Ω such that
dPa
dP0
|Ft = γat .
The process (Zat ) with
Zat = Zt +
∫ t
0
(
δas
σ
)
ds
is a Brownian motion under Pa. Therefore, any action process (at) induces a probability
measure Pa on Ω for which the dynamics of cash flows is given by Equation (4).
Problem formulation. Following the literature, a contract is a triplet (C, τL, a) that
specifies nonnegative transfers C = (Ct) (remuneration) from the principal to the agent, a
stopping time τL at which the project is liquidated and an action process (at) that the prin-
cipal recommends to the agent. The process (Ct) is FX-adapted, nondecreasing (reflecting
agent’s limited liability), τL is an FX-stopping time, and, for any action process (at), we
assume
Ea
[∫ τL
0
e−rsdCs
]
< +∞. (5)
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Throughout the paper (FXt ) denotes the Pa-augmentation of the filtration generated by
(Xt)t≥0 and T X the set of FX-stopping times.
For a fixed contract Γ = (C, τL, a). The agent’s expected profit and the principal’s
expected profit associated to Γ are respectively,
VA(Γ) = Ea
[∫ τL
0
e−rt(Bat dt+ dCt)
]
,
and
VP (Γ) = Ea
[∫ τL
0
e−rt(Xt dt− dCt)
]
.
An incentive-compatible action process a∗(C, τL) = (a∗t (C, τL)) is an agent best reply in
term of effort to a given remuneration and liquidation policy (C, τL). That is, for any action
process a, the action process a∗(C, τL) satisfies
Ea
[∫ τL
0
e−rt(Bat dt+ dCt)
]
≤ Ea∗(C,τL)
[∫ τL
0
e−rt(Ba∗t (C, τL) dt+ dCt)
]
.
We say that a contract (C, τL, a) is incentive compatible or (C, τL) induces an effort
strategy a∗(C, τL) if a = a∗(C, τL). An optimal contract is an incentive compatible contract
that maximizes the expected principal’s profit at date 0 subject to delivering to the agent
a payoff larger than her reservation utility w0 > 0. The principal problem is then to find, if
any, an optimal contract. Formally, the principal studies the problem
sup
C,τL
Ea∗(C,τL)
[∫ τL
0
e−rt(Xt dt− dCt)
]
(6)
s.t Ea∗(C,τL)
[∫ τL
0
e−rt(Ba∗t (C, τL) dt+ dCt)
]
≥ w0. (7)
We refer inequality (7) as the agent’s participation constraint.
3 Incentive compatibility and Markov formulation
This section develops in our setting a standard result due to Sannikov [20] generalized by
Cvitanic, Possama¨ı and Touzi [4] and [5]: the continuation value of the agent (defined below)
characterizes the incentive compatible actions and allows for a Markov formulation of the
principal’s problem (6)-(7).
Fix a contract Γ = (C, τL, a) and assume for a while that the action process (at) is
incentive compatible which yields that both players have the same set of information. Let
us define the process W Γ = (W Γt ) as
W Γt = Ea
[∫ τL
t
e−r(s−t)(Basds+ dCs) | FXt
]
.
The process W Γ corresponds to the agent’s continuation value process associated to a con-
tract Γ. Because C is an increasing process and action process a takes positive values,
W Γt ≥ 0 for all t ≤ τL while W ΓτL = 0 by construction. The following holds.
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Lemma 3.1. The continuation value process W Γ associated to the incentive compatible
contract Γ satisfies under Pa the dynamics
dW Γt = (rW
Γ
t −Bat) dt+ βΓt dZat − dCt for t ≤ τL, (8)
where the process βΓ = (βΓt ) is FX predictable and uniquely defined. It is called hereafter
the sensitivity process.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. By assumption (5), the process (Ut) with
Ut = e
−rtW Γt +
∫ t
0
e−rs(Basds+ dCs) = Ea
[∫ τL
0
e−rs(Basds+ dCs)|FXt
]
is a uniformly integrable martingale under Pa. By the martingale Representation theorem,
there exists a unique FX predictable process (βΓt ) such that
Ut = Y0 +
∫ t
0
e−rsβΓs dZ
a
s ,
with
Ea
[∫ τL
0
e−2rs(βΓs )
2 ds
]
< +∞.
Then, Itoˆ’s formula, yields (8). 2
Thus, any incentive compatible contract Γ = (C, τL, a) defines a unique sensitivity process
(βΓt ) by the representation theorem for Brownian martingale that yields (8). We could
interpret Lemma 3.1 in the framework of BSDE as follows: for any given incentive compatible
contract Γ = (C, τL, a), there exists a unique pair of FX adapted process (W Γt , βΓt ) such that{
W ΓτL = 0,
dW Γt = (rW
Γ
t −Bat) dt+ βΓt dZat − dCt.
However, the question of characterizing incentive-compatible contracts that satisfy the agent’s
participation constraint (7) remains unanswered. That is, we have to characterize the set
Γ(w0) of contracts Γ for which a = a
∗(C, τL) and, W Γ0 is greater than the participation
constraint w0.
To solve this problem, the idea of Sannikov (2008) has been to see the sensitivity process
(βΓt ) as a control. To this end, let us consider the class of FX measurable processes β = (βt)
such that
Ea
[∫ ∞
0
e−2rsβ2s ds
]
< +∞, (9)
and, for any fixed increasing process C, let us consider the process W β = (W βt ) that satisfies
the controlled stochastic differential equation under P0,
dW βt = (rW
β
t + h(βt)) dt+ βt dZt − dCt and W β0 ≥ w0,
with h(β) = inf0≤a≤1( δσβ−B)a. We would like the process (W βt ) to play the role of the agent
continuation value associated to some incentive compatible contract Γ ∈ Γ(w0). By limited
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liability, this requires W βt ≥ 0 up to the termination date of the contract Γ. Therefore, we
introduce
τβ0 (C) = inf{t ≥ 0 , W βt = 0}.
Let us recall that we have assumed so far that the action process (at) is incentive com-
patible. The next lemma characterizes incentive compatible contracts as a deterministic
function of the control process β.
Lemma 3.2. For any compensation process (Ct) satisfying (5) and any process (βt) satis-
fying (9), the contract Γ = (C, τβ0 (C), 1 βt<σBδ
) is incentive compatible and belongs to Γ(w0).
Proof of Lemma 3.2. The proof follows from a standard application of the martingale
optimality principle. For any compensation process (Ct) satisfying (5) and any process (βt)
satisfying (9), the process (Rt) with
Rat = e
−rtW βt +
∫ t
0
e−rs(Basds+ dCs)
is a uniformly integrable Pa-supermartingale for every action process (at) and a uniformly
integrable Pa∗-martingale where, for any t ≥ 0, a∗t = 1 βt<σλ with λ = Bδ . Therefore
Ea
[∫ τβ0 (C)
0
e−rt(Batdt+ dCt)
]
≤ Ra0
= W β0
= Ra
∗
0
= Ea∗
[∫ τβ0 (C)
0
e−rt(Ba∗tdt+ dCt)
]
(10)
2
Therefore, the principal’s problem is to find a contract Γ = (C, τβ0 (C), 1 β<λσ) that max-
imizes her expected profit at date 0. This leads to the following Markov formulation of
problem (6)-(7).
VP (x,w0) = max
w≥w0
VP (x,w) (11)
where
VP (x,w) = sup
C,β
Ea∗
[∫ τβ0 (C)
0
e−rs(Xs ds− dCs)
]
with a∗ = (a∗t ) and a
∗
t = 1 βt<σλ,
such that
dXt = −δ1 βt<σλ dt + σdZt with X0 = x, (12)
dWt = (rWt −B1 βt<σλ) dt+ βtdZt − dCt with W0 = w. (13)
The last result of this section shows that postponing payments is an optimal policy for
the principal. Therefore, in the study of the principal’s problem, we can simply consider a
remuneration scheme with a terminal lump-sum payment.
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Lemma 3.3. It is always optimal for the principal to postpone payments and to pay the
agent only at the liquidation time with a lump-sum payment.
Proof of Lemma 3.3.
First, observe that, from (10), the Principal’s value function (11) can be re-written as
VP (x,w0) = maxw≥w0(v(x,w)− w) where
v(x,w) = sup
C,β
Ea∗
[∫ τβ0 (C)
0
e−rs(Xs +B1 βs<λσ) ds
]
s.t (12) and (13). (14)
The amount v(x,w) corresponds to the total surplus generated by the project in our moral
hazard framework.
Second, note that τβ0 (C) = σ
β
0 ∧ τ˜β0 (C) where for any fixed increasing process (Ct), we
have
τ˜β0 (C) = inf{t ≥ 0, W βt− = 0},
and
σβ0 = inf{t ≥ 0, (∆C)t = W βt− and (∆C)t > 0}.
Third, with no loss of generality, a remuneration process can be written under the form
(Ct)t<τβ0 (C)
+ W(τβ0 (C))−
1 t=τβ0 (C)
. Therefore, a control policy can be viewed as a pair (C, β)
and a stopping time τ at which the Principal pays W βτ− and liquidate. Thus, we have
v(x,w) = sup
C,β,τ
Ea∗
[∫ τ∧τ˜β0 (C)
0
e−rs(Xs +B1 βs<λσ) ds
]
.
Observe that τ˜β0 (0) corresponds to the liquidation time when the principal postpones
payments up to liquidation. We have
v(x,w) ≥ sup
β,τ
Ea∗
[∫ τ∧τ˜β0 (0)
0
e−rs(Xs +B1 βs<λσ) ds
]
, choosing C = 0 (15)
≥ Ea∗
[∫ (σβ0∧τ˜β0 (C))∧τ˜β0 (0)
0
e−rs(Xs +B1 βs<λσ) ds
]
, choosing τ = σβ0 ∧ τ˜β0 (C)
= Ea∗
[∫ σβ0∧τ˜β0 (C)
0
e−rs(Xs +B1 βs<λσ) ds
]
, observing τ˜β0 (C) ≤ τ˜β0 (0). (16)
Taking the supremum over the controls C, β in (16) yields v(x,w). It follows from (15) that
v(x,w) = sup
β,τ
Ea∗
[∫ τ∧τ˜β0 (0)
0
e−rs(Xs +B1 βs<λσ) ds
]
, (17)
which proves that it is optimal to postpone payments. 2
We summarize our findings as follows. The principal solves the maximization problem
max
w≥w0
(v(x,w)− w)
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where
v(x,w) = sup
β,τ
Ea∗
[∫ τ∧τ˜β0
0
e−rs(Xs +B1 βs<λσ) ds
]
, (18)
with
τ˜β0 = inf{t ≥ 0, Wt− = 0};
The Markov process (Xt,Wt) is defined by
dXt = −δ1 βt<σλ dt + σdZt with X0 = x,
dWt = (rWt −B1 βt<σλ) dt+ βtdZt with W0 = w.
The supremum in (18) is taken over the class of FX-adapted processes β such that
Ea∗
[∫ ∞
0
e−2rsβ2s ds
]
< +∞
and over stopping time τ ∈ T X .
Solving problem (18) remains very challenging and so far an open question, to the best
of our knowledge. The next section restricts the analysis to contracts that are incentive
compatible with the full effort action process at = 0 for every t.
4 Full effort contracts.
We focus on full-effort contracts, that is the class of contracts that induces the agent to
exert effort at any time. It follows from Lemma 3.2 that the full-effort action process a = 0
is incentive compatible if and only if βt ≥ λσ for all t ≥ 0. Restricting the analysis to
contracts that incentivize the full-effort action leads to re-write problem (18) as follows:
Find a contract Γ = (Wτ−1 t=τ , τ ∧ τ˜β0 , 0) where the pair (τ, β) is solution to
v(x,w) = sup
β≥λσ,τ
E0
[∫ τ∧τ˜β0
0
e−rsXs ds
]
(19)
such that
dXt = σdZt with X0 = x, (20)
dWt = rWt + βtdZt with W0 = w, (21)
where
τ˜β0 = inf{t ≥ 0, Wt− = 0}.
Problem (19) boils down to a two-dimensional optimal exit decision, hence optimal stopping
theory is from now on the key mathematical tool.
Let us consider the sub-solution to problem (19)-(21) where the constraint on the incen-
tives contract is binding (that is when βt = λσ for all t ≥ 0). This yields the two-dimensional
constrained optimal stopping problem
u(x,w) = sup
τ
E0
[∫ τ∧τ˜λσ0
0
e−rsXs ds
]
(22)
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such that
dXt = σdZt with X0 = x,
dWt = rWt dt+ λσdZt with W0 = w,
and
τ˜λσ0 = inf{t ≥ 0, Wt− = 0}. (23)
Observe also that the unconstrained stopping problem
v0(x) = sup
τ
E0
[∫ τ
0
e−rsXs ds
]
(24)
corresponds to the firm value in a frictionless world in which there are no asymmetry of
information and private benefits. Problem (24) is a standard real option problem that has
an explicit solution (see for instance Dixit and Pindyck [9]). We have, for x ≥ x∗,
v0(x) =
x
r
− x
∗
r
eθ(x−x
∗), with θ =
−√2r
σ
and x∗ =
1
θ
.
The threshold x∗ is the profitability threshold below which it is optimal to trigger the firm
liquidation in the frictionless world. That is, the stopping time
τ ∗ = inf{t ≥ 0, Xt ≤ x∗} (25)
is optimal for (24).
We are ready to state our main result.
Theorem 4.1. The following holds
(i) For all (x,w) ∈ R × R+, v(x,w) = u(x,w). Furthermore, u(x,w) = v0(x) for all
(x,w) ∈ R× R+ such that w ≥ λ(x− x∗).
(ii) The contract ((Wτ∗−1 t=τ∗)t≥0, τ
∗ ∧ τ˜λσ0 , 0) is a solution to problem (19), (20), (21).
Thus, the principal optimally postpones payments and pays to the agent the amount Wτ∗−
if τ ∗ ≤ τ˜λσ0 or nothing if τ ∗ > τ˜λσ0 . Either the principal stops at the frictionless threshold
τ ∗, or stops at τ˜λσ0 because the agent has limited liability. We will further comment this
optimal payment policy at the end of this section where we discuss the implementation of
the optimal contract.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is challenging and requires a series of steps. We comment
each step, pointing out the novelty of our results. To ease the reading, we develop in the
appendix the most technical arguments.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. To alleviate notations, we write in the sequel τ0 in place of τ˜
λσ
0 .
We use whenever needed the following notations: (Xxt ) (resp. (W
w
t )) denotes the process
(Xt) starting at X0 = x (resp. the process (Wt) starting at W0 = w), and τ
∗ the stopping
time inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt = x∗} (resp. τw0 , the stopping time inf{t ≥ 0 : Wwt− = 0}).
We start with the study of the constrained optimal stopping problem (22). We show the
following.
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Proposition 4.2. The exit time τR = τ
∗∧ τ0 of the open rectangle R = (x∗,+∞)× (0,+∞)
is optimal for (22). That is,
u(x,w) = E0
[∫ τR
0
e−rsXs ds
]
.
Moreover, if w ≥ λ(x− x∗) then, u(x,w) = v0(x).
Proof of Proposition 4.2. We first show that u(x,w) = v0(x) for every w ≥ λ(x − x∗).
Note that (Wt−λXt) is an increasing process up to time τ0 because d(Wt−λXt) = rWt dt ≥ 0,
and thus Wt −w ≥ λ(Xt − x). Therefore, if w ≥ λ(x− x∗), we have Wt ≥ λ(Xt − x∗). As a
consequence, τ0 ≥ τ ∗ almost surely. Thus, for w ≥ λ(x− x∗),
v0(x) ≥ u(x,w)
≥ E0
[∫ τ∗∧τ0
0
e−rsXs ds
]
= E0
[∫ τ∗
0
e−rsXs ds
]
= v0(x).
Second, we show that for all x > x∗ and w > 0, u(x,w) is strictly positive. Let 0 < w <
λ(x− x∗) and ε = λ(x− x∗)− w. Let us introduce the finite stopping time
τε = inf{t ≥ 0, Xt = x∗ + ε
λ
}.
Because, Wt ≥ λ(Xt − x∗) − ε, we have τ0 ≥ τε almost surely. Dynamic programming
principle implies
u(x,w) ≥ E0
[∫ τε
0
e−rsXs ds
]
+ E0[e−rτεu(Xτε ,Wτε)]
≥ E0
[∫ τε
0
e−rsXs ds
]
=
x
r
− x
∗ + ε
λ
r
eθ(x−(x
∗+ ε
λ
))
> 0 because ε > 0.
This latter result allows us to conclude the proof. Because u > 0 on R, the process
Mt = e
−r(t∧τR)u(Xt∧τR ,Wt∧τR) +
∫ t∧τR
0
e−rsXs ds
is a martingale according to optimal stopping theory. Optional sampling theorem gives for
all t ≥ 0,
u(x,w) = E0
[
e−rt∧τRu(Xt∧τR ,Wt∧τR) +
∫ t∧τR
0
e−rsXs ds
]
.
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Note that τR ≤ τ ∗ which is the hitting time of x∗ by a Brownian motion. Therefore, τR is
almost surely finite. Moreover, u = 0 on the boundaries of R. Letting t tend to +∞ gives
u(x,w) = E0
[∫ τR
0
e−rsXs ds
]
.
This concludes the proof. 2
To prove Theorem 4.1, it remains to show that functions u and v coincide. The road
map is as follows. We consider the HJB equation formally associated to the value function
v, that is
max(max
β≥λσ
L(β)v,−v) = 0 on R× R+, (26)
with the boundary condition v(x, 0) = 0 and where L(β) is the fully degenerate differential
operator
L(β)V ≡ −rV (x,w) + x+ rw∂V
∂w
(x,w) +
1
2
σ2
∂2V
∂x2
(x,w) +
1
2
β2
∂2V
∂w2
(x,w) + σβ
∂2V
∂x∂w
(x,w).
We prove that u is a smooth solution to (26). Then, a standard verification argument based
on Itoˆ’s formula yields u = v. The novelty of our analysis is to establish required continuity
and smoothness properties of the value function u. The more involved results are about
regularity properties of u with respect to w. In particular, we prove that u is locally Lips-
chitz with respect to w ((assertion ii) of Proposition 4.3 and Lemma 4.4) and we show the
existence of ∂u
∂w
(x, 0) (Proposition 4.5).
Proposition 4.3. The value function u is jointly continuous over [x∗,+∞) × [0,∞) and
C∞ over R = (x∗,+∞)× (0,+∞). Furthermore, it satisfies
max(L(λσ)u,−u) = 0 (27)
almost everywhere on R× R+.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Clearly, u(x) = 0 for x ≤ x∗. To show that u is jointly
continuous over [x∗,+∞)× [0,∞), we prove that, for any (x,w) ∈ [x∗,+∞)× [0,+∞),
i) u is Lipschitz with respect to x, uniformly in w,
ii) u is locally Lipschitz with respect to w.
According to Proposition 4.2, we have for every x > x0,
u(x,w)− u(x0, w) = E0
[∫ τ∗,x∧τ0
0
e−rsXxs ds
]
− E0
[∫ τ∗,x0∧τ0
0
e−rsXx0s ds
]
where τ ∗,x = inf{t ≥ 0, x + σZt ≤ x∗}. Because the stopping time τ ∗,x ∧ τ0 is suboptimal
starting from X0 = x0, we get
u(x,w)− u(x0, w) ≤ E0
[∫ τ∗,x∧τ0
0
e−rs(x− x0) ds
]
≤ x− x0
r
.
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Thus, assertion (i) is proven. The proof of assertion (ii) is more involved and relies on the
following lemma proved in the appendix.
Lemma 4.4. For every couple (x,w) ∈ (x∗,+∞)× (0,+∞), there is a constant C such that
u(x,w) ≤ C(1 + x)w.
For every w > w0, we have τ
w
0 ≥ τw00 a.s. and thus by Strong Markov Property, we have
for all w > 0,
u(x,w)− u(x,w0) = E0
[∫ τ∗∧τw0
0
e−rsXxs ds
]
− E0
[∫ τ∗∧τw00
0
e−rsXxs ds
]
= E0
[∫ τ∗∧τw0
τ∗∧τw00
e−rsXxs ds
]
= E0
[
e−rτ
w0
0 1 {τw00 ≤τ∗}u(X
x
τ
w0
0
, (w − w0)erτ
w0
0 )
]
≤ CE0[(Xx
τ
w0
0
+ 1)1 {τw00 ≤τ∗}](w − w0),
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 4.4. Now, observe that for every t ≥ 0, we
have Wt − w0 ≥ λ(Xxt − x) and thus Xxτw00 ≤ x on the set {τ
w0
0 ≤ τ ∗} which ends the proof
of assertion (ii) and, in turn, the proof that u is jointly continuous over [x∗,+∞)× [0,∞).
Now, from optimal stopping theory, the continuous value function u is a viscosity solution
to (27) (see for instance, Pham [18], Theorem 4.3.1). We will show that, for any  > 0, u
satisfies (27) over R = (x
∗,+∞)× (,+∞) in the classical sense. To this end, we introduce
a deterministic transformation of the process (Xt,Wt) where{
dXt = σdZt,
dWt = rWt dt+ λσdZt.
Such transformation unveils a parabolic nature of the problem and is similar to the method
of characteristics in PDE analysis. Given (x,w) ∈ R, let us define
St = λXt −Wt − λx∗ with S0 = s = λ(x− x∗)− w.
We have {
dSt = −rWt dt,
dWt = rWt dt+ λσdZt.
Consider the function uˆ(s, w) = u(x∗ + 1
λ
(w + s), w). The function uˆ is jointly continuous
because u is jointly continuous. By results on interior regularity for solution to parabolic
PDE (see, Krylov [16], Ch 2, Sect. 4, Corollary 3), for any  > 0, the solution on any
rectangle Rˆ = (0,+∞)× (,+∞) to
rw
∂f
∂s
= rw
∂f
∂w
+
λ2
2
∂2f
∂w2
+ x∗ +
1
λ
(w + s)
with boundary condition f = uˆ on ∂Rˆ, is C
∞(Rˆ) and coincides with uˆ. Therefore, for any
 > 0, uˆ is C∞(Rˆ) which, in turn, implies that u is C∞(R) and satisfies L(λσ)u = 0 on the
open set R where u > 0 in the classical sense. Thus, u satisfies
max(L(λσ)u,−u) = 0
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almost everywhere on R× R+. This ends the proof of Proposition 4.3. 2
We need additional properties to prove that the value function u is also a smooth solution
to (26) almost everywhere on R × R+. Because, u = 0 and L(β)u ≤ 0 for every β ≥ λσ
on the set {x ≤ x∗}, it is enough to prove that u satisfies maxβ≥λσ L(β)u = 0 over R =
(x∗,+∞)× (0,+∞). We use the following result that we prove in the Appendix.
Proposition 4.5. For any x > x∗,
∂u
∂w
(x, 0) exists and is finite. Moreover, for any (x,w) ∈
R, the value function u satisfies
(i)
∂u
∂w
(x,w) = E0
[
1 τ0≤τ∗
∂u
∂w
(Xτ0 , 0)
]
≥ 0,
(ii)
∂2u
∂w2
(x,w) < 0,
(iii) (
∂2u
∂x∂w
+ λ
∂2u
∂w2
)(x,w) < 0.
Proposition 4.5 appears in the literature in different settings, (see for instance, Faingold
and Vasama [10], De Marzo and Sannikov [8]). Assertion (ii) corresponds to a concavity
property of the value function with respect to the agent’s continuation value w. This prop-
erty is standard in one dimensional agency models.4 Together with assertion (iii), it implies
that choosing β > λσ is suboptimal in the (two-dimensional) HJB equation (26). In their
respective settings, recent contributions provide heuristic justifications of properties (ii) and
(iii) based on a stochastic representation for ∂v
∂w
, this latter representation is obtained by dif-
ferentiating the HJB equation associated to the value function v of the principal’s problem.
In particular, the regularity properties of the value function v over R needed to establish the
stochastic representation are not proven. The main forgetting is the proof of the existence
and finiteness of ∂v
∂w
(x, 0) that is instrumental in the proof of assertions (i), (ii) and (iii). To
the best of our knowledge our paper is the first that offers a complete proof of Proposition 4.5.
The next Proposition follows from Propositions 4.3 and 4.5 and concludes the proof of
Theorem 4.1.
Proposition 4.6. The value function u satisfies the HJB equation (26). Therefore, the two
value functions u and v coincide.
Proof of Proposition 4.6. Because u satisfies the HJB equation (27) almost everywhere
on R× R+, it is enough to prove that L(β)u ≤ 0 everywhere for all β ≥ λσ. It is straight-
forward when u = 0. Thus, we have to prove that L(β)u ≤ 0 on R for all β ≥ λσ. By
Proposition 4.5, it is immediate that the function β −→ L(β)u takes its maximum over
[λσ,+∞[ at λσ. Therefore, u satisfies (26). By a standard verification result, u dominates
the value function v. Because the reverse inequality holds by definition, the two value func-
tions u and v coincide. This ends the proof of Proposition 4.6 and Theorem 4.1. 2
4See Sannikov [20] and De Marzo and Sannikov [7].
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To conclude this section, we discuss optimal policies, the implementability of the optimal
contract and specify the relationship to the existing literature.
Optimal payment policies. It follows from the proof of Theorem 4.1 that, once the
agent’s continuation payoff (Wt) reaches λ(Xt−x∗), the payment policy Wτ∗−1 t=τ∗ guarantees
optimal liquidation of the firm. Another policy that leads to optimal liquidation once Wt
reaches λ(Xt−x∗) is to pay the agent at continuous rate rWt dt up to the optimal liquidation
time τ ∗. To see this, assume that the couple (x,w) satisfies the relation w = λ(x− x∗) and
consider the payment policy dCt = rWt dt. The dynamics
dXt = σdZt X0 = x,
dWt = rWt + λσdZt − dCt W0 = w,
imply that dWt = λdXt, from which we deduce that Wt = λ(Xt− x∗). In turn, τ0 = τ ∗ a.s.,
that is, the continuation value process W reaches zero at the optimal liquidation time τ ∗.
Consistent with (10), a direct computation yields that
w = E0
[∫ τ∗
0
e−rtrWs ds
]
, (28)
and, accordingly, the value of the principal satisfies
VP (x,w) = E0
[∫ τ∗
0
e−rs(Xsds− dCs)
]
= v0(x)− w.
The above remark shows that paying cash earlier is not costly for the principal provided
that the principal can ensure that the profitability process reaches the optimal liquidation
threshold x∗ before the continuation value of the agent falls to zero.
To summarize, when initial values (x,w) satisfy w < λ(x− x∗), deferring payments give
incentives to the agent, the continuation value rises and the risk of inefficient liquidation is
reduced. Once the agent has established a high performance record, that is when contin-
uation value Wt reaches λ(Xt − x∗), any payment policy that leads to liquidation at τ ∗ is
optimal. The same idea is present in He [11] and in DeMarzo and Sannikov [8] where pay-
ments to the agent are postponed until inefficient liquidation can be avoided.5 Note that, as
it is usual in dynamic contracting models, the agent may be fired without any compensation
at all after a series of bad outcomes leading to inefficient liquidation.6
Implementation. When cash flows generated by the firm are modeled as the increment of
an arithmetic Brownian motion, the agent’s continuation payoff can be linked to actual cash
5In DeMarzo and Sannikov [8], cash flows are modeled as the increment of an arithmetic Brownian
motion with an unknown drift. Optimal liquidation occurs when beliefs about the constant drift fall to
an endogenous threshold. The principal can ensure optimal liquidation once the agent has established
a sufficiently high record. In He (2009), liquidation is always inefficient. When the agent establishes a
sufficiently high record, the principal can design payments in such a way that the continuation value of
the agent becomes proportional to the firm size that follows a geometric brownian motion. Thus, the
continuation value of the agent remains always positive and liquidation never occurs.
6For instance, in standard models with i.i.d shocks, payouts to the manager take place when the agent’s
continuation value reaches a payout threshold (see for instance Biais, Mariotti and Rochet [1]).
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flows and a combination of long term debt, equity and credit line implements the optimal
contract as shown for instance in DeMarzo and Sannikov [7] or Biais, Mariotti, Plantin and
Rochet [2].7 This is not the case in our setting where the firm’s profitability fluctuates across
time. We share this feature with He [11] whose analysis about the implementation of the
optimal contract directly applies to our model.
Precisely, let us again consider that w = λ(x − x∗) and let us re-write (28) under the
form
w = E0
[∫ τ∗
0
e−rtrλ(Xt − x∗) dt
]
= rλv0(x) + E0
[∫ τ∗
0
e−rt(−rλx∗) dt
]
.
This latter expression shows that the agent’s financial security corresponds to a fraction rλ
of the firm value plus a corporate debt with coupon flow −rλx∗.
Following He [11], we design an Incentive Points Plan where the points trace the agent’s
continuation value Wt to implement an optimal contract. The agent starts with w points.
Once Wt hits zero, the agent is fired. When the agent establishes a high record, that is
when Wt = λ(Xt − x∗), she can redeem these points and get a portion of dividends rλdt
onward together with a coupon payment flow −rλx∗dt. Thus, a performance-based grant
that involves a stock and a bond implement the optimal contract. The difference with the
He’s implementation simply relies on the presence of the bond in the performance-based
grant. This is due to the strategic liquidation issue in our model.
Finally, because of agency frictions, the principal is willing to start the project only if
max
w≥w0
(v(x,w)− w) > 0.
An easy computation shows that, if rλ < 1 then, v0(x) > λ(x− x∗) for x sufficiently large,
which shows that the set {(x,w) ∈ R | v(x,w)− w > 0} is non empty. Therefore, when the
agency costs, measured by the parameter λ are not too high, a project with sufficiently high
profitability is undertaken.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we consider a dynamic contracting model in corporate finance with moral
hazard in which the principal is concerned both with the profitability of the firm that
fluctuates across time and with the agent’s actions on the profitability. This led us to study
a two-dimensional fully degenerate control problem. We derived the Markovian formulation
of the principal’s problem and proved regularity properties of the associated value function
that allow to derive the optimal contract.
We noticed that our regularity results apply to other contracting problems in which
regularity issues were overlooked. At a more general level, our work is an attempt to bridge
the gap between the continuous time agency model with unobservable managerial effort
and the conventional real option literature. Real option theory allows to study a large
7This also holds true for DeMarzo and Sannikov [8].
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set of problems such as investment opportunities and investment timing, sequential and/or
incremental investments, entry and exit strategies. Dealing with these problems in dynamic
contracting models with unobservable managerial effort requires a mathematical setting with
serially correlated cash flows and leads to challenging two-dimensional control problems. We
believe that our model sets a stage for studying more sophisticated real option problems in
an agency framework.
We derived the optimal contract of principal’s problem in the class of full effort contracts.
We know from previous studies that, when cash flows are defined as the increment of an
arithmetic Brownian motion, we can find restrictions on the parameters of the model that
ensure never inducing shirking is indeed optimal.8 This remark has been taken as a rationale
for restricting attention to full effort contracts in economic applications. We show below
that this result does not extend to our setting in which the firm’s profitability fluctuates.
To see this point, let us consider the HJB equation formally associated to the value function
v in (17), that is
max(max
β
(L(β)V + (B(1− ∂V
∂w
(x,w))− δ∂V
∂x
(x,w))1 β<λσ),−V ) = 0 (29)
and consider (x,w) with w ≥ λ(x − x∗), so that u(x,w) = v0(x). It is easy to see that v0
does not satisfy the HJB equation (29). Indeed, a direct computation yields
max
β
(
L(β)v0(x) +
(
B − δ∂v0
∂x
(x)
)
1 β<λσ
)
=
(
B − δ
r
(1− eθ(x−x∗))
)
1 β<λσ.
The last expression is strictly positive for β < λσ and for x in a right neighborhood of x∗. It
then follows that, incentivizing the agent to exert full effort at any time cannot be optimal.
The economic intuition is simple: when the realized profitability is close from the one that
triggers liquidation in a frictionless world, incentivizing the agent becomes very costly and
taking action a = 0 is no longer optimal. Clearly, this situation does not occur in a setting
in which the profitability of the firm is constant.
Problem (29) relates to optimal control problems with discontinuous coefficients. Typ-
ically, a class of problems about which we know very little. Characterizing the optimal
contract in a moral hazard environment with random profitability and identifying when to
release pressure on a firm’s manager are clearly important economic issues. This and related
questions must await for future work.
8See DeMarzo and Sannikov [7], Zhu [27].
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6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.4. We start with the following observation: for every couple (x,w) ∈
(x∗,+∞)× (0,+∞), there is some C > 0 such that u(x,w) ≤ C(1 + x). Indeed,
u(x,w) ≤ E0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rs|x+ σZs| ds
]
≤ x
r
+ σE0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rs|Zs| ds
]
=
x
r
+ σ
√
2
pi
E0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rs
√
s ds
]
≤ C(1 + x).
Therefore, Lemma 4.4 holds for w ≥ 1. Let us now consider w ∈ (0, 1). We decompose
u(x,w) as follows u(x,w) = u1(x,w) + u2(x,w), with
u1(x,w) = E0
[
1 {τw0 <τw1 }
∫ τ∗∧τw0
0
e−rs(x+ σZs) ds
]
,
u2(x,w) = E0
[
1 {τw0 >τw1 }
∫ τ∗∧τw0
0
e−rs(x+ σZs) ds
]
,
where τw1 = inf{t ≥ 0, Wwt = 1}. On the event {τw0 < τw1 }, we have for every t ≤ τ ∗∧τw0 < τw1
the inequality Xt ≤ 1λ + x. Therefore,
u1(x,w) ≤
(
1
λ
+ x
)
E0
[
1 {τw0 <τw1 }
∫ τw0
0
e−rs ds
]
.
Conditioning the process (Wt)t∈[0,τw1 ] on the event {τw0 < τw1 } and using Doob h-transform
(see Rogers and Williams [19] for a definition) makes (Wt)t∈[0,τw1 ] a diffusion absorbed at 0
with generator
L˜ = λ
2σ2
2
∂2.
∂w2
+
(
rw + λσ
h′(w)
h(w)
)
∂.
∂w
where
h(w) = P0(τw0 < τw1 ) =
∫ 1
w
e−rs
2
ds∫ 1
0
e−rs2 ds
.
Let us denote τ˜w0 = inf{t ≥ 0, W˜wt = 0} where
dW˜t =
(
rW˜t + λσ
h′(W˜t)
h(W˜t)
)
dt+ λσdZt.
We have
E0
[
1 {τw0 <τw1 }
∫ τw0
0
e−rs ds
]
= P0(τw0 < τw1 )E0
[∫ τ˜w0
0
e−rs ds
]
≤ E0
[∫ τ˜w0
0
e−rs ds
]
= φ˜(w).
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The function φ˜ satisfies
L˜φ˜− rφ˜ = 0
with φ˜(0) = 0. A computation shows that rw+λσ h
′(w)
h(w)
< 0 and because φ˜ is nondecreasing,
we get that φ˜ is convex. We deduce that φ˜(w) ≤ Cw for some positive constant C which
implies u1(x,w) ≤ C(1 + x)w. Now, we decompose u2 as follows:
u2(x,w) = E0
[
1 {τw0 >τw1 }
∫ τ∗∧τw1
0
e−rs(x+ σZs) ds
]
+ E0
[
1 {τw0 >τw1 }
∫ τ∗∧τw0
τ∗∧τw1
e−rs(x+ σZs) ds
]
= u3(x,w) + u4(x,w).
Because for every s ≤ τw1 , we have Xs ≤ 1λ + x, it follows that
u3(x,w) ≤
(
1
λ
+ x
)∫ ∞
0
e−rs ds P0[τw0 > τw1 ]
=
1
λ
+ x
r
P0[τw0 > τw1 ]
=
1
λ
+ x
r
(1− h(w))
≤ C(1 + x)w.
Finally, Strong Markov property implies
u4(x,w) = E0
[
1 {τw0 >τw1 }e
−r(τ∗∧τw1 )u(Xτ∗∧τw1 ,Wτ∗∧τw1 )
]
≤ E0 [1 {τw0 >τw1 }e−rτw1 u(Xτw1 , 1)]
≤ E0 [1 {τw0 >τw1 }e−rτw1 C(1 +Xτw1 )]
≤ C(1 + 1
λ
+ x)P0[τw0 > τw1 ]
≤ C(1 + x)w,
where the first inequality holds because u(x∗,Wτ∗) = 0. This ends the proof of Lemma 4.4.
2
Proof of Proposition 4.5. We will show that, for w sufficiently small, u(x,w) = c(x)w+
o(w) where c(x) is a real constant. This will prove that ∂u
∂w
(x, 0) < +∞.
We have
u(x,w) = E0
[∫ τw0
0
e−rs(x+ σZs) ds
]
− E0
[∫ τw0
τR
e−rs(x+ σZs) ds
]
= A−B. (30)
First, observe that
A =
x
r
(1− l(w)) + E0
[∫ τw0
0
e−rsσZs ds
]
, (31)
where, we set l(w) = E0[e−rτw0 ]. Following [3], ch. 2, we introduce the function φ defined as
the non-increasing fundamental solution on R of
σ2λ2
2
φ′′ + rwφ′ − rφ = 0,
with φ(0) = 1, lim
w→+∞
φ(w) = 0.
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The function l coincides with φ on (0,+∞) and in particular l is twice continuously dif-
ferentiable over (0,∞) with l′(0+) < +∞. It follows that, for w small enough, 1 − l(w) =
−l′(0+)w + o(w).
We now study the second term on the rhs of (31). Let us define the P0- uniformly
integrable martingale
Nt =
∫ t
0
e−rsdZs = e−rtZt − r
∫ t
0
e−rsZs ds.
Optional Sampling Theorem gives E0[Nτw0 ∧T ] = 0. Then, letting T → +∞,
E0
[∫ τw0
0
e−rsZs ds
]
= −1
r
E0[e−rτw0 Zτw0 ]. (32)
Observe that e−rtWt = w+λσNt is thus a P0- uniformly square integrable martingale. Using
the dynamics of (Wt), we deduce that
we−rt + re−rt
∫ t
0
Ws ds+ λσe
−rtZt
is a P0- uniformly integrable martingale, thus the Optional Sampling Theorem yields
w = E0[e−r(T∧τw0 )WT∧τw0 ] = wE
0[e−r(T∧τ
w
0 )] + rE0
[
e−r(T∧τ
w
0 )
∫ T∧τw0
0
Ws ds
]
(33)
+ λσE0
[
e−r(T∧τ
w
0 )ZT∧τw0
]
.
Letting T tend to ∞, we obtain
w = wE0(e−rτw0 ) + rE0
[
e−rτ
w
0
∫ τw0
0
Ws ds
]
+ λσE0
[
e−rτ
w
0 Zτw0
]
.
Using (32) and (33) one gets
E0
(∫ τw0
0
e−rsZs ds
)
=
1
λσr
w(E0[e−rτw0 )− 1] + 1
λσ
E0
[
e−rτ
w
0
∫ τw0
0
Ws ds
]
=
1
λσ
(
1
r
w(l(w)− 1) + E0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rτ
w
0 1 s≤τw0 Ws ds
])
=
1
λσ
(
1
r
w(l(w)− 1) + E0
[∫ ∞
0
E0[e−rτw0 |Fs]1 s≤τw0 Ws ds
])
=
1
λσ
(
1
r
w(l(w)− 1) + E0
[∫ τw0
0
e−rsl(Ws)Ws ds
])
,
where the last equality follows from the Strong Markov property. Now, it remains to prove
that
g(w) ≡ E0
[∫ τw0
0
e−rsl(Ws)Ws ds
]
= cw + o(w),
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for w small enough. First, we show that the function w → wl(w) is bounded. Let us consider
the real function k(w) =
∫∞
w e
− r
σ2λ2
t2
dt∫∞
0 e
− r
σ2λ2
t2
dt
which is the smooth solution to
σ2λ2
2
k
′′
+ rwk′ = 0, (34)
k(0) = 1, lim
w→+∞
k(w) = 0. (35)
Note that the function θ = k − l is twice continuously differentiable, bounded over (0,∞)
and satisfies θ(0) = limw→+∞ θ(w) = 0 together with
σ2λ2
2
θ
′′
+ rwθ′ = −rl ≤ 0.
Then, the process (θ(Wt))t is a P0 bounded supermartingale and thus for every T > 0
E0[θ(Wτw0 ∧T )] ≤ θ(w).
Letting T → +∞, we conclude θ(w) ≥ 0 because θ is bounded with θ(0) = 0. It follows
that l(w)w ≤ k(w)w over [0,∞). We observe that lim
w→∞
wk(w) = 0 and thus lim
w→∞
wl(w) = 0.
Therefore, the function w → wl(w) is bounded on [0,∞) and the function g is well-defined.
Assume for a while the existence of f bounded C2 solution on R to the differential
equation.
σ2λ2
2
f
′′
+ rwf
′ − rf + wl(w) = 0, f(0) = 0. (36)
Itoˆ’s formula yields for every T > 0,
E0
[
e−r(T∧τ
w
0 )f(WT∧τw0 )
]
= f(w)− E0
(∫ T∧τw0
0
e−rsl(Ws)Ws ds
)
. (37)
Observe that
E0
[
e−r(T∧τ
w
0 )f(WT∧τw0 )
]
= E0
[
e−rTf(WT )1 T≤τw0
]
becausef(0) = 0
≤ ||f ||∞e−rT .
The monotone convergence theorem gives
lim
T→+∞
E0
[∫ T∧τw0
0
e−rsl(Ws)Ws ds
]
= g(w).
Letting T goes to +∞ in (37), we have that g coincides with f on (0,+∞). Therefore,
g is a bounded, twice continuously differentiable function over (0,∞) and thus g(w) =
g′(0+)w + o(w).
The existence of a bounded solution of (36) comes from the general form of solutions
given by the method of variation of constants,
f(x) = αx+ βl(x) + l(x)
∫ x
0
u2l(u)
W (u)
du− x
∫ ∞
x
ul2(u)
W (u)
du,
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where W (x) = 2
σ2
(l(x) − xl′(x)) is the Wronskian. Because l ≤ k and W (x) = Ce− rσ2λ2 x2
(see [3], ch. 2), the two integrals
∫ x
0
u2l(u)
W (u)
du and
∫ x
0
ul2(u)
W (u)
du converge. Then, it suffices to
choose α = 0 and β = − ∫∞
0
u2l(u)
W (u)
du to conclude.
Summing up our results, we have obtained
u˜(x,w) ≡ E0
[∫ τw0
0
e−rs(x+ σZs) ds
]
= c(x)w + wη(w), lim
w→0
η(w) = 0.
Moreover, observe that η is a continuous bounded function on (0,+∞). We now turn to the
second term of (30). We will show that, for w sufficiently small,
B = E0
[∫ τw0
τR
e−rs(x+ σZs) ds
]
= Cw + o(w),
where C is a constant that may depend on x. Strong Markov Property yields
B = E0
[
1 {τ∗<τw0 }
∫ τw0
τ∗
e−rs(x+ σZs) ds
]
= E0
[
1 {τ∗<τw0 }e
−rτ∗u˜(x∗,Wwτ∗)
]
= E0
[
1 {τ∗<τw0 }e
−rτ∗(CWτ∗ +Wwτ∗η(Wwτ∗))]
= CE0
[
1 {τ∗<τw0 }e
−rτ∗Wwτ∗
]
+ E0
[
1 {τ∗<τw0 }e
−rτ∗Wwτ∗η(W
w
τ∗)
]
= Cw + E0
[
1 {τ∗<τw0 }e
−rτ∗Wwτ∗η(W
w
τ∗)
]
,
where the last equality used again the Optional Sampling Theorem with the martingale
(e−rtWt)t because τ ∗ is almost surely finite. We will end the proof by showing that
E0
[
1 {τ∗<τw0 }e
−rτ∗Wwτ∗η(W
w
τ∗)
]
= o(w)
for sufficiently small w. For every ε > 0, there is some δ > 0 such that |η(w)| ≤ ε for all
w < δ. Now, fix ε > 0, w < δ and introduce the stopping time
τwδ = inf{t ≥ 0, Wwt = δ}.
We have∣∣∣E0 [1 {τ∗<τw0 }e−rτ∗Wwτ∗η(Wwτ∗)] ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣E0 [e−rτ∗Wwτ∗η(Wwτ∗)1 {τ∗<τw0 }1 {τ∗≤τwδ }]
+ E0
[
e−rτ
∗
Wwτ∗η(W
w
τ∗)1 {τ∗<τw0 }1 {τ∗>τwδ }
] ∣∣∣
≤ εE0 [e−rτ∗Wwτ∗1 {τ∗<τw0 }]+ ||η||∞E0 [e−rτ∗Wwτ∗1 {τ∗<τw0 }1 {τ∗>τwδ }]
≤ εw + ||η||∞E0
[
e−rτ
w
δ Wwτwδ 1 {τwδ <τw0 }
]
.
Proceeding analogously as in the proof of Lemma 4.4, we define on the set {τwδ < τw0 } the
diffusion (Wˆt)t≤τ0 absorbed at δ using Doob h-transform and obtain
E0
[
e−rτ
w
δ Wτwδ 1 {τwδ <τw0 }
]
= P0[τwδ < τw0 ]E0
[
e−rτˆ
w
δ Wˆτˆwδ
]
.
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Now, both expressions P0(τwδ < τw0 ) and E0
[
e−rτˆ
w
δ Wˆτˆwδ
]
= δE0
[
e−rτˆ
w
δ
]
converges to zero
when w converges to zero. Moreover, as in Lemma 4.4, P0(τwδ < τw0 ) = Cw + o(w). This
ends the proof that ∂u
∂w
(x, 0) exists and is finite. Furthermore, we observe that the function
x→ ∂u
∂w
(x, 0) is nondecreasing because x→ u(x,w) is nondecreasing.
Proof of assertion (i). We have for ε > 0,
u(x,w + ε)− u(x,w) = E0
[∫ τεR
0
e−rsXs ds
]
− E0
[∫ τR
0
e−rsXs ds
]
where τ εR = inf{t ≥ 0, (x + σZt, w + ε +
∫ t
0
rWs ds + λσZt) /∈ R} ≥ τR. Strong Markov
property gives for the first term
E0
[∫ τεR
0
e−rsXs ds
]
= E0
[∫ τR
0
e−rsXs ds
]
+ E0
[
e−r(τ
∗∧τw0 )u(Xτ∗∧τw0 ,W
w+ε
τ∗∧τw0 )
]
.
Using u(x∗, w) = 0 for all w > 0, we get
1
ε
(u(x,w + ε)− u(x,w)) = 1
ε
E0
[
e−rτ
w
0 u(Xτw0 ,W
w+ε
τw0
)1 τ∗≥τw0
]
.
Now, observe that Ww+ετ0 = εe
rτw0 and thus
1
ε
(u(x,w + ε)− u(x,w)) = E0
[
u(Xτw0 , εe
rτw0 )
εerτ
w
0
1 τ∗≥τw0
]
≥ 0. (38)
From Proposition 4.5, we know that the random variable
u(Xτw0
,εerτ
w
0 )
εerτ
w
0
1 τ∗≥τw0 converges to
∂u
∂w
(Xτw0 , 0)1 τ∗≥τw0 almost surely when ε tends to zero. Moreover, up to a constant, it is
bounded above by 1 +Xτw0 by Lemma 4.4. Now observe that
λXτw0 ≤ λx− w
on the set {τ ∗ ≥ τw0 } and thus 1 + Xτw0 is bounded on this set. Then, the dominated con-
vergence Theorem yields assertion (i) by letting ε tend to zero in (38).
Proof of Assertion (ii). First, we will prove that Xx
τ
w0
0
≥ Xx
τ
w1
0
for any w0 ≤ w1 on the
set {τw10 < +∞}. Note that τw00 ≤ τw10 almost surely for w0 ≤ w1. We integrate λdXt =
dWt − rWt dt on the interval (τw00 , τw10 ) on the set {τw10 < +∞}. We obtain
λ(Xx
τ
w1
0
−Xx
τ
w0
0
) = −Ww1
τ
w0
0
− r
∫ τw10
τ
w0
0
Ww1s ds ≤ 0.
According to assertion (i),
∂u
∂w
(x,w0) = E0
[
1 τw00 ≤τ∗
∂u
∂w
(Xx
τ
w0
0
, 0)
]
≥ E0
[
1 τw10 ≤τ∗
∂u
∂w
(Xx
τ
w0
0
, 0)
]
≥ E0
[
1 τw10 ≤τ∗
∂u
∂w
(Xx
τ
w1
0
, 0)
]
=
∂u
∂w
(x,w1),
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where the last inequality comes from the fact x → ∂u
∂w
(x, 0) is nondecreasing. Thus, the
function w → ∂u
∂w
is a decreasing function. Because we know that u is twice continuously
differentiable over R, we get assertion (ii).
Proof of assertion (iii). Let us consider f defined as
f(x) =
∂u
∂w
(x, λ(x− c)) for x ≥ x∗.
To prove assertion (iii), we will show that f is nonincreasing for any c such that (x, λ(x−c))
is in R. Take x0 ≤ x1 and wi = λ(xi − c) for i = 0, 1. From assertion (ii), we have
f(x0) = E0
[
1 τw00 ≤τ∗,x0
∂u
∂w
(Xx0
τ
w0
0
, 0)
]
.
We will show that 1 {τw00 ≤τ∗,x0} ≥ 1 {τw10 ≤τ∗,x1} or equivalently that
{τw00 > τ ∗,x0} ⊂ {τw10 > τ ∗,x1}.
On the set {τw00 > τ ∗,x0}, we have
Xx1τ∗,x0 = x
∗ + x1 − x0,
Ww1τ∗,x0 = W
w0
τ∗,x0 + (w1 − w0)erτ
∗,x0 .
Therefore,
Ww1τ∗,x0 − λXx1τ∗,x0 = Ww0τ∗,x0 + (w1 − w0)erτ
∗,x0 − λ(x∗ + x1 − x0)
≥ λ(x1 − x0)(erτ∗,x0 − 1)− λx∗
≥ −λx∗,
and thus for all t ≥ τ ∗,x0 , we have Ww1t ≥ λ(Xx1t − x∗). This implies τw10 > τ ∗,x1 . Conse-
quently,
f(x0) ≥ E0
[
1 τw10 ≤τ∗,x1
∂u
∂w
(Xx0
τ
w0
0
, 0)
]
.
Proceeding as previously, on the set {τw10 < +∞}, we have
λ(Xx0
τ
w0
0
−Xx1
τ
w1
0
) = r
(∫ τw10
0
Ww1s ds−
∫ τw00
0
Ww0s ds
)
≥ 0.
Thus,
f(x0) ≥ E0
[
1 τw10 ≤τ∗,x1
∂u
∂w
(Xx1
τ
w1
0
, 0)
]
= f(x1).
2
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